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PRESCRIPTION FOR DEATH: A SECOND OPINION
Edward J. Larson*
INTRODUCTION
The growing debate over legalizing physician-assisted suicide typ-
ically leads to disagreement over the type of patients who would be
eligible for it. Proponents often seek to justify legalization by point-
ing to compelling cases of mentally competent but terminally ill in-
dividuals crying out for release from pain through death with dig-
nity.1 Opponents of legalization counter by questioning how many
such cases actually exist, and by raising concerns about its impact
on elderly, infirm, and other vulnerable people.' The proponents'
perspective clearly controlled the recent ruling in Compassion in
Dying v. Washington,' in which Federal District Judge Barbara
Rothstein held that certain persons have a constitutional right to
receive a physician's assistance in committing suicide. That
unprecedented holding, which has excited widespread comment,5 re-
lied heavily on the compelling circumstances of three individuals6 to
* Associate Professor of Law and History, University of Georgia, and Fellow, Discovery Insti-
tute; B.A. 1974, Williams College; M.A. 1976, University of Wisconsin-Madison; J.D. 1979,
Harvard University; Ph.D. 1984, University of Wisconsin-Madison. The author wishes to thank
Yale Kamisar, Bruce Chapman, and John West for their generous advice and encouragement in
the preparation of this article.
1. See, e.g., EUTHANASIA: THE MORAL ISSUES (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds.,
1989) (containing a collection of essays supporting and opposing euthanasia).
2. Id.
3. 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
4. The court concluded that "competent, terminally ill adult[s] ha[ve] a constitutionally guar-
anteed right under the Fourteenth Amendment to commit physician-assisted suicide." Id. at 1462.
The court went on to find that the statutory ban placed "an undue burden on the exercise of a
protected Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest by terminally ill, mentally competent adults act-
ing knowingly and voluntarily, without undue influence from third parties, who wish to commit
physician-assisted suicide." Id. at 1467.
5. Within weeks after the decision appeared, it was included in the 1994 supplement to a lead-
ing health-law casebook. Barry R. Furrow et al., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 182-90 (2d ed. Supp. 1994). Articles and editorials about the decision have appeared
widely in the popular media. See, e.g., Melinda Beck, A Lesson in Dying Well, NEWSWEEK, May
16, 1994, at 58; Joseph P. Shapiro, A "Roe v. Wade" on Suicide?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
May 16, 1994, at 20.
6. The plaintiffs, Jane Roe, John Doe and James Poe were suffering from cancer, AIDS, and
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overturn a state law against assisted suicide.
I. HISTORICAL VALIDITY OF THE LAW
Compassion in Dying involved a Washington State statute that is
similar to laws in most American jurisdictions - like most states,
Washington does not outlaw suicide or attempted suicide.8 Rather,
the law at issue proscribes aiding or causing the suicide of another. 9
It provides: "[a] person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt
when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt
suicide."' 10
emphysema respectively. Each was competent and had been diagnosed to be in the terminal phase
of his disease. Each wished to hasten his death by taking drugs prescribed by his doctor. Compas-
sion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1456-57.
7. Id. at 1467.
8. Id. at 1458.
9. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(1) (1988). Promoting suicide is a felony punishable by im-
prisonment for up to five years and a fine of up to $10,000. Id. § 20.020 (1)(c). Over thirty states
currently outlaw assisted suicide. ALAN MIESEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE, § 3.10, at 60 (Supp. II
1994); see ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (Michie 1993); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(A)(3)
(Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(2) (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West
1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104 (1)(b) (Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-56 (West
1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (Michie Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West
1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5 (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-702 (1987); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-42-1-2.5 (Burns 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 204 (West 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 752.1027 (West Supp. 1994) (stating that the criminal
offense of assistance to suicide does not apply to prescribing or administering medications or pro-
cedures if the intent is to relieve pain and not to cause death even if the medication or procedure
may hasten or increase the risk of death); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215 (West Supp. 1995) (pro-
viding that health care workers who administer, prescribe, or dispense "medications or procedures
to relieve another person's pain or discomfort," even if it hastens the risk of death, is not consid-
ered aiding suicide or aiding attempted suicide as contemplated by the statute unless knowingly
administered to cause death); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.023(2)
(Vernon Supp, 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (1989);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN, § 630:4 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West 1982); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-2-4 (Michie 1994); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-16-04 (Michie Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 813-18 (West 1983); OR. REV.
STAT. § 163.125(1)(b) (1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2505-06 (1983 & Supp. 1994); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-216 (Michie Supp. 1994); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (West 1989);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060 (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.12 (West 1982).
Some states qualify the prohibitions to permit the administration of pain relief, even if such
therapy increases the risk or occurrence of death. See, e.g.. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 752.1027 (West
Supp. 1994) (stating that the criminal offense of assistance to suicide does not apply to prescribing
or administering medications or procedures if the intent is to relieve pain and not to cause death
even if the medication or procedure may hasten or increase the risk of death); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.215 (West Supp. 1995) (providing that health care workers who administer, prescribe, or
dispense "medications or procedures to relieve another person's pain or discomfort," even if it
hastens the risk of death, is not considered aiding suicide or aiding attempted suicide as contem-
plated by the statute unless knowingly administered to cause death).
10. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(I) (1988).
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Obviously, this is a broad prohibition. Nothing in the statute fo-
cuses on physicians as actors or on the elderly, terminally ill, or
those in pain as recipients." It protects all life and discourages sui-
cide without regard to the victim's condition, covering confused
teenagers and depressed 40-year-olds, as well as the infirm.1" In-
deed, the statute was enacted long before modern medical technol-
ogy highlighted the issues of a patient's right to die and physician-
assisted suicide.' 3 As a practical matter, rather than a philosophical
musing, these issues simply did not arise before the current genera-
tion because there was so little that a physician could do to forestall
death."'
Restrictions against assisted suicide were in place in Washington
even before the region became a state. The second bill passed by the
first territorial legislature for Washington, in 1854, provided,
"[e]very person deliberately assisting another in the commission of
self-murder, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter.' 5 Throughout
the years, Washington has retained similar prohibitions against as-
sisted suicide,'" and an effort to amend it to allow physician-assisted
suicide was defeated by state voters in 1991. The laws restricting
assisted suicide manifest a broad public concern for preserving life.
More critically, it suggests that the law does not so intrude on "per-
sonal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty' "I as to violate our constitutionally pro-
tected right to privacy, at least as that right is defined in the key
11. The language of the Washington statute provides simply that a person is guilty if he
"knowingly causes or aids another person ... ." Id.
12. Id. In fact, the state claimed that the statute as enacted was designed to promote two
primary interests - the prevention of suicide and the protection of those at risk of undue influ-
ence of others who would aid them in committing suicide. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at
1464. For a discussion of these interests, see infra notes 57-105 and accompanying text.
13. Washington's statute prohibiting assisted suicide was enacted in 1975. See WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988) (providing historical notes for the statute).
14. See John E. Ruark et al., Initiating and Withdrawing Life Support, 318 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 25 (1988) (stating that one hundred years ago only rudimentary supportive care was availa-
ble for critically ill patients).
15. 1854 Wash. Laws p. 78, § 17.
16. See, e.g., 1869 Wash. Laws p. 201, § 17; 1873 Wash. Laws p. 184, § 19; and 1909 Wash.
Laws, ch. 249, § 135.
17. See Jane Gross, Voters Turn Down Mercy Killing Idea, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at B16
(explaining the initiative, voted down by Washington state voters, which would have allowed phy-
sicians to assist in the deaths of terminally ill patients who asked to die).
18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
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line of decisions running from Griswold v. Connecticut"9 to Roe v.
Wade.2
Simply because the Washington State bar historically has been
against physician-assisted suicide does not, in and of itself, make it a
good rule. As Oliver Wendell Holmes keenly observed, "[iut is re-
volting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." 21 Yet
Washington State's age-old stance against assisted suicide does not
run afoul of this dictum. Preserving life and preventing death re-
main a socially protected, common goal in this country. In its pre-
sent form, the Washington law reflects the influence of the Model
Penal Code,22 which one court recently described as "widely re-
garded as the greatest criminal law reform project of this century
19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
Connecticut statute which made it illegal for any person to use contraception or to assist another
in the use of contraception. Id. at 480. Justice Douglas, writing for a plurality stated that the
marital relationship lies "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees," and that a law banning the use of contraceptives "cannot stand in light of the famil-
iar principle ... that a 'governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.' " Id. at 485 (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 377
U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
In his concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg quoted from an earlier Supreme Court decision to
conclude that judges "must look to the 'traditions and [collective] conscience of our people' to
determine whether a principle is 'so rooted [there] ...as to be ranked as fundamental.'" Id. at
493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1937)). Ap-
plying a similar test to review the constitutionality of a new state law against assisted suicide, a
Michigan appellate court recently concluded that "the right to commit suicide" is neither "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty" nor "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."
Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487, 492 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted).
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the Court considered whether the right of privacy encom-
passed a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. Id. at 153. The Court held
that, because a woman's right to decide whether or not to terminate a pregnancy is fundamental,
the state must have a compelling interest in impinging upon that right. Id. at 155-56. The Court
found that before the viability of a fetus, the state does not have a compelling interest to overcome
the woman's right of privacy. Id. at 156. For a thorough discussion of the Roe and Griswold line
of cases and their constitutional significance, see LAWRENCE H. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 15-10, at 1337-1362 (2d ed. 1988).
21. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1920).
22. The Model Penal Code provides that "[a] person who purposely aids or solicits another to
commit suicide is guilty of a felony of the second degree if his conduct causes such suicide or an
attempted suicide, and other of a misdemeanor." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5(2) (1962); see
also Stanford Kadish, The Model Penal Code's Historical Antecedents. 19 RUTGERS L.J. 521
(1988) (discussing the history of the Model Penal Code).
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The drafters of the Model Penal Code considered the arguments
in favor of de-criminalizing assisted suicide, but ultimately decided
to retain the traditional feature of Anglo-American criminal law of
preserving life. 4 In the commentary to the Code, the drafters noted
that "the interests in the sanctity of life that are represented by the
criminal homicide laws are threatened by one who expresses a will-
ingness to participate in taking the life of another, even though the
act may be accomplished with the consent, or at the request, of the
suicide victim."25 Indeed, it is difficult to think of a more effective
way of discouraging suicide than to stop others from helping the
victim. In the past thirty years, following the publication of the
Model Penal Code, eight states have passed new statutes specifically
outlawing assisted suicide and eleven other states, including Wash-
ington, revised their existing statutes. 6 In short, the history of the
Washington State law against assisted suicide suggests an original
intent and current purpose of discouraging suicide generally. In this
respect, it is similar to such statutes in most states, none of which
has ever been declared unconstitutional, and differs from Michigan's
controversial law against assisted suicide, which recently was en-
acted to stop one physician from helping terminally-ill patients kill
themselves.27
Before Judge Rothstein's recent decision in Compassion in Dying,
there was no hint in any published judicial opinion that Washing-
ton's law against assisted suicide, or others like it elsewhere in
America, were unconstitutional. Indeed, contrary to the implications
of her decision, the United States Supreme Court in its 1990 deci-
23. People v. Kevorkian, 517 N.W.2d 293, 295 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
24. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 cmt. 5 (1962) (discussing how the interest in the sanctity
of life would be undermined by allowing assisted suicide).
25. Id.
26. Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 95 (1985).
27. Michigan physician Dr. Jack Kevorkian was acquitted on the charge that he helped
Thomas Hyde, a terminally ill patient in the last stages of Lou Gehrig's disease, commit suicide in
violation of Michigan's law against assisted suicide. Yale Kamisar, The Real Reason Dr. Kevor-
klan Was Acquitted, LEGAL TiMES, May 30, 1994, at 26. See generally Stephanie B. Goldberg,
Death By Choice: Two Courts Clash on Constitutional Right to Assist Suicide, 80 A.B.A. J. 73
(1994) (explaining Dr. Kevorkian's involvement in much of Michigan's litigation concerning eu-
thanasia). In May, 1994, a state appellate court overturned the Michigan law on the grounds that
it violated a state constitutional bar against a statute having two objectives, but went on to reject
plaintiffs' claim that the law "deprives citizens of a [federal] constitutional right protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d
487, 492-93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
1995]
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sion involving the right to die, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of
Health, 8 suggested that laws against assisted suicide were constitu-
tional. 9 In her decision, Judge Rothstein wrote:
In Cruzan, the Supreme Court considered whether a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted, life-sus-
taining medical treatment including artificially delivered food and water es-
sential to life. In his majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that
this principle "may be inferred from our prior decisions," . . and that "the
logic of the cases . . . would embrace such a liberty interest." . . . He then
assumed for the purposes of the case before the Court "that the United
States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally pro-
tected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition."'s
Judge Rothstein went on to inquire "whether a constitutional dis-
tinction can be drawn" between the situation in Cruzan involving
the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment and the case of
competent, terminally ill patients who wish to hasten death with a
physician's aid. 31 "In other words," she asked, "is there a difference
for purposes of finding a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest be-
tween refusal of unwanted treatment which will result in death and
committing physician-assisted suicide in the final stage of life?"3
Judge Rothstein failed to note that the Cruzan Court all but an-
swered this very question in the negative. Almost immediately fol-
lowing the quoted passage suggesting that patients can refuse treat-
ment, Chief Justice Rehnquist added, "[m]oreover, the majority of
States in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one
who assists another to commit suicide. We do not think a State is
required to remain neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary
decision by a physically able adult to starve to death."33 This obser-
vation suggests that the Supreme Court would uphold a clean bar
against assisted suicide, such as Washington's historic statute. Addi-
tionally, the court would likely find a constitutionally meaningful
line between a patient's right to refuse medical treatment and her
demand for assistance in committing suicide.
28. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
29. See id. at 284 (upholding state law requiring clear and convincing evidence to refuse life-
sustaining treatment).
30. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1461 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990).
[Vol. 44:461
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II. EVALUATING THE LIBERTY INTEREST
Beyond the law's untainted legislative history and the total ab-
sence of constitutional precedent for Judge Rothstein's holding, cur-
rent public-policy arguments strongly support the law.34 Judge
Rothstein struck down the Washington statute on the grounds that
mentally competent, terminally ill adults wishing to commit physi-
cian-assisted suicide have a protected liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 5 In Cruzan, the
Supreme Court noted that individual liberty interests are something
less than constitutional rights and must be balanced against compet-
ing societal interests to determine whether they prevail.36 The State
of Washington, in its defense of the statute prohibiting assisted sui-
cide, raised two of these societal interests,3 7 both of which were
twisted by the court.3 8
A. Discouraging Suicide
The first state interest identified in Compassion in Dying involved
protecting life by preventing suicide.3 9 With respect to this interest,
the court wrote:
In support of the first interest, prevention of suicide, defendants point to
statistics concerning the rate of suicide in Washington among various age
groups, particularly the young. Obviously, the State has a strong, legitimate
interest in deterring suicide by young people and others with a significant
natural life span ahead of them. But this case is not about people for whom
suicide would abruptly cut life short. Plaintiffs in this case are people suffer-
ing through the final stage of life with no hope of recovery.'
It must be stressed, however, that the court struck down the law for
everyone, not just the three terminally ill plaintiffs involved in the
case."' The case failed to indicate the force of the state's suicide
34. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text (detailing the arguments which support the
law).
35. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1467.
36. 497 U.S. at 279.
37. The states contended that they have an interest both in preventing suicide and in protecting
those at risk of suicide from undue influence from others who would aid them in completing the
act. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1464.
38. See infra notes 57-105 and accompanying text (discussing the court's analysis of the socie-
tal interests).
39. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1464.
40. Id.
41. Judge Rothstein noted that the state's legitimate interest in suicide prevention would not be
"abrogated by allowing mentally competent, terminally ill patients to freely and voluntarily com-
1995]
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statistics. Suicide is a major social concern in both the state of
Washington and the country as a whole. Ranking among the top ten
causes of death in the United States, with more than 25,000 cases
reported annually. 2 In Washington State, suicide takes twice as
many lives annually as all infectious diseases and over two-thirds as
many deaths as automobile accidents.4 a The state vigorously seeks to
combat both of these other causes of death, and logically attempts
to discourage suicide as well.
In America, suicide by young people has increased dramatically
in recent years, with persons aged 15-to-24 years now committing
about 20 percent of all suicides." Indeed, the number of suicides by
persons in that age group is nearly as high as all Americans over 50
years of age, who are the presumed target population for physician-
assisted suicide. 45 Further, there are twice-as many suicides by per-
sons aged 25-to-44 as by senior citizens.46 These figures are even
more dramatic among some ethnic groups, such as Native Ameri-
can, where the suicide rate is over twice as high for youths as for
adults and four times higher for youths than for senior citizens."7 In
Washington State, the relative youth of suicide victims is suggested
by the state statistic that the average number of years lost by each
suicide is over twice that lost by each cancer death.48
Advocates of physician-assisted suicide tend to focus on cases in-
volving the elderly, particularly those who are terminally ill.4 9 How-
ever, the issue is far from simple even in those most compelling
cases. According to suicide researcher David Clark, "[t]he major
studies all agree in showing that the fraction of suicide victims
struggling with a terminal illness at the time of their death is in the
mit physician-assisted suicide." Id.
42. Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
May-June 1993, at 32, 38.
43. WASHINGTON STATE DEPT. OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, AGE-ADJUSTED DEATH
RATES. WASHINGTON STATISTICS, 1980-87 at 5-10 (1990).
44. Kamisar, supra note 42, at 38 (discussing the suicide rate among various age groups).
45. Id.
46. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH UNITED STATES, 1992, at 107
(1992).
47. Id.
48. WASHINGTON STATE DEPT. OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, AGE-ADJUSTED DEATH
RATES. WASHINGTON STATISTICS, 1980-87 at 107, 134 (1990).
49. See, e.g., Timothy E. Quill, Risk Taking by Physicians in Legally Gray Areas, 57 ALB. L.
REV. 693, 697 (1994) (using an example of an elderly man and other nursing home residents to
advocate on behalf of assisted suicide).
[Vol. 44:461
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range of 2 % to 4 % ."50 Even among senior citizens, Clark added,
most "were in relatively good physical health when they died by
suicide. ' 5' Further, University of Rochester geriatric psychiatrists
Yeates Conwell and Eric Caine recently noted that "90 to 100 per-
cent of the [suicide] victims die while they have a diagnosable psy-
chiatric illness, an observation that is equally true in suicides among
the elderly." '52 Such illness typically involves treatable depression.5 3
Conwell and Caine warned that many physicians are ill-equipped to
assess the presence of depressive illness in the elderly population.5
Without this ability, physicians, although well-intentioned, might be
influenced by their personal biases about aging, the psychological
effects of chronic disease, and dependency, when considering a pa-
tient's wish for assistance in suicide.55 This observation clearly im-
plicates the ruling in Compassion in Dying, which extended the au-
thority to prescribe lethal drugs to all physicians, and not just to
those trained in geriatric psychiatry.56
In addressing the state's concern for protecting life, Judge Roth-
stein added, "[tihe State's interest in preventing suicide by prohibit-
ing any manner of assisted suicide in actuality arises out of its ap-
prehension of the 'slippery slope' problem. The State is concerned
that allowing any exception to a total ban will encourage the grad-
ual development of a more permissive attitude toward suicide. 57
After conceding "the general validity" of this concern, the court dis-
missed it by stating: "[t]he court has no doubt that the legislature
can devise regulations which will define the appropriate boundaries
of physician-assisted suicide for terminally ill individuals, and at the
same time give due recognition to the important public policy con-
50. David C. Clark, "Rational" Suicide and People with Terminal Conditions or Disabilities,
8 ISSUEs L. & MED. 147, 151 (1992).
51. Id. at 152-53.
52. Yeates Conwell & Eric D. Caine, Rational Suicide and the Right to Die: Reality and
Myth, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1100, 1101 (1991) (citations omitted).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1102.
55. Id.
56. The court's ruling speaks in terms of "physician-assisted suicide" without any limits on the
term "physician." None of the five physician plaintiffs involved in the case had formal training in
psychiatry. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1457-58 (W.D. Wash.
1994).
57. Id. at 1464. Judge Rothstein continued: "That attitude, the State fears, will erode the socie-
tal constraints now hindering people from committing suicide themselves or countenancing the
thought as an appropriate course of action for others, and will result in more suicides by those
temporarily depressed, distraught, or mentally disturbed." Id.
1995]
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cerns regarding the prevention of suicide."'58 This bald affirmation,
which presumes Solomonic wisdom for the part-time state legisla-
tors of Washington, provides a peculiar basis for voiding an earlier
enactment by those same solons.
More critically, Judge Rothstein incorrectly characterized the
slippery slope involved in the case. The issue is not that a limited
exception to the law against assisted suicide will encourage greater
acceptance of suicide,59 but rather that it involves maintaining those
limits, which is not as easy as the court suggests. Admittedly, the
line between assisted suicide and terminating treatment, the one
Judge Rothstein found unconstitutional,6" is not neat and logical.
No line is - hence creating the slippery slope.
The line that Judge Rothstein drew between the "terminally ill"
and other seriously ill persons is a particularly difficult one to main-
tain. University of Michigan constitutional scholar Yale Kamisar
noted:
Why should the non-terminal nature of a person's suffering disqualify her as
a candidate for assisted suicide? If personal autonomy and the termination
of suffering are the key factors fueling the right to assisted suicide, how can
we exclude those with non-terminal illnesses or disabilities who might have
to endure greater suffering over a much longer period of time? Why should
a quadriplegic or a person afflicted with severe arthritis have to continue to
live what she considers an intolerable existence for a number of years. Why
doesn't such a person have an equal claim - or even a greater one - to
assisted suicide?"1
Kamisar's questions expose a fatal flaw in Judge Rothstein's reason-
ing here - one that was reflected in the right-to-die litigation in-
volving Elizabeth Bouvia. 62 Bouvia was a mentally competent, 28-
year-old quadriplegic who suffered from a Jobian litany of afflictions
and was physically dependent on a feeding tube but not terminally
58. Id. at 1465.
59. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Rothstein's response to the
concern that allowing physician-assisted suicide will result in a greater acceptance of suicide).
60. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1467. Judge Rothstein also struck down the statute
as violating equal protection. The Judge stated:
The distinction between the terminally ill patient who requests that her physician
remove the life support systems necessary to maintain her life, and the terminally ill
patient whose condition does not require life support systems but who seeks physician-
administered aid to end her life, is not a narrowly drawn classification tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.
Id.
61. Yale Kamisar, After Assisted Suicide, What Next?, LEGAL TIMES, May 30, 1994, at 26.
62. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
470 [Vol. 44:461
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ill.6 She sought to end her life by requesting the discontinuation of
tube feeding." In reviewing her case, the trial court concluded that
the right to have life-support equipment disconnected was limited to
comatose and terminally ill patients and, thus, rejected her re-
quest.65 A California appellate court properly disagreed, stating that
"there is no practical or logical reason to limit the exercise of this
right to 'terminal' patients."66
Elizabeth Bouvia's condition was physically obvious.6 7 However, it
is also difficult to see why the line should be drawn at the point of
objectively documented suffering. Shouldn't a person's subjective
apprehension of suffering control if, as Judge Rothstein asserted,
"personal autonomy"68 is the controlling factor? That inevitable re-
sult was reached recently in the Netherlands, which is the only na-
tion that currently condones physician-assisted suicide.6 9 In the past,
that policy was limited to the terminally ill who suffer severe physi-
cal pain.7 In 1994, however, the Dutch Supreme Court held that it
also protected a physician who had assisted in the suicide of a seri-
63. Id. at 300.
64. Id. at 298.
65. Id. at 302.
66. Id.
67. The court noted that the plaintiff was completely bedridden. "Except for a few fingers of
one hand and some slight head and facial movements, she is immobile." Id. at 300. The court
further noted that she was totally dependent on others for "feeding, washing, cleaning, toiletirig,
turning, and helping her with elimination and other bodily functions." Id.
68. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1460 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
69. See Maurice A. deWachter, Euthanasia in the Netherlands, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-
Apr. 1992, at 23, 23 (stating that although euthanasia is still technically illegal, physicians who
adhere to three conditions recognized by the Dutch courts and endorsed by the State Commission
on Euthanasia are not subject to criminal sanctions). The three conditions noted by deWachter
not subject to criminal sanctions are: 1) voluntariness; 2) unbearable suffering; and 3) consulta-
tion. Id.; see also G. STEVEN NEELY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SUICIDE 158-64 (1994)
(discussing the development of Euthanasia law in the Netherlands). The definition of euthanasia
widely accepted in the Netherlands is "the active termination of a patient's life at his or her
request, by a physician." deWachter, supra at 23.
70. NEELY. supra note 69, at 159. A 1971 Dutch decision afforded a terminally ill patient with
unbearable suffering the right to request and receive assistance in dying from his attending physi-
cian. Id. In the case, a Dutch physician injected her terminally ill mother with a lethal dose of
morphine. Id. When the physician was brought to trial, the court acknowledged that it was not
unusual for a physician in the Netherlands to prescribe pain medication that would shorten a
patient's life. Id. A 1981 ruling expanded the right to cover non-terminal patients afflicted with
continuous, unbearable physical and spiritual suffering. Id. In 1983, the standard was further
relaxed to require only continuous suffering without any mention of unbearable suffering as a
condition. Id. See generally CARLOS F. GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE
OF THE NETHERLANDS (1991) (discussing the practice of euthanasia in the. Netherlands and the
controls set up to limit its practice).
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ously and irreversibly depressed but otherwise healthy patient. 7' As
the Dutch physician stated, "[i]ntolerable psychological suffering is
no different from intolerable physical suffering. 72
Judge Rothstein's decision dealt only with assisted suicide, where
the victim performs the final act. 73 The logic of the ruling, however,
equally applies to euthanasia, where the physician performs the final
act." Washington and every other state condemn active euthanasia
as murder.75 Yet some otherwise competent, terminally ill persons
physically are unable to perform a final, death-causing act. If physi-
cian-assisted suicide is a constitutional right for such people, then
why should they be denied a right to die when and how they choose
simply because they cannot perform the final act by themselves? 76
Indeed, the Netherlands has one of the most liberal policies on phy-
sician-assisted suicide, 77 but cases of physician-performed euthana-
sia are over five times more common in that country than cases of
physician-assisted suicide.78 Similarly, even though Judge Rothstein
71. See Anastasia Toufexis, Killing the Psychic Pain, TIME, July 4, 1994 at 61 (discussing the
recent ruling by the Dutch Supreme Court that physician assisted suicide is lawful).
72. Id.
73. The American Medical Association (AMA) defines "assisted suicide" to be when a "physi-
cian provides a patient with the medical means and/or the medical knowledge to commit suicide."
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 5 CODE OF MED-
ICAL ETHICS REPORTS 269 (1994) (Rept. # 59, Physician-Assisted Suicide). In a nationwide study
of physicians regarding euthanasia and other medical decisions concerning the end of life, "as-
sisted suicide" was defined as the "intentional assistance given to a person to terminate his or her
own life upon that person's request." AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, EUTHANASIA - PHYSI-
CIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE: LESSONS IN THE DUTCH EXPERIENCE, BOARD OF TRUSTEES REPORT 1-93-
51 at 3 (1993).
74. The AMA defines "euthanasia" as "the administration of a lethal agent by another person
to a patient for the purpose of relieving the patient's intolerable and incurable suffering." COUN-
CIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, AMA ETHICAL OPIN-
ION 2.21, EUTHANASIA, CURRENT OPINIONS ANN. (1994). "Euthanasia" was defined in a nation-
wide study as "an intentional act to terminate life by a person other than the person involved upon
request of the latter." AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, EUTHANASIA - PHYSICIAN ASSISTED
SUICIDE: LESSONS IN THE DUTCH EXPERIENCE, BOARD OF TRUSTEES REPORT 1-93-51, at 3 (1993).
75. Kamisar, supra note 42, at 35-36 (stating that there is a uniform ban among the states
against active euthanasia and discussing generally the distinction between active euthanasia and
assisted suicide).
76. See id. at 35 (stating that the distinction between assisted suicide and euthanasia is
mechanical and without a real difference).
77. See supra notes 69-71 (discussing the Netherlands' policy and law on euthanasia).
78. Toufexis, supra note 71, at 61; see also DAVID CUNDIFF, EUTHANASIA IS NOT THE ANSWER
102 (1992) (stating that in one study on euthanasia in the Netherlands the physician performed
euthanasia at the request of the patient in 1.8% of all deaths in the study whereas the physician
provided medication for the patient to commit suicide in 0.3% of the cases); D. Alan Shewman,
Active Voluntary Euthanasia: A Needless Pandora's Box, 3 ISSUES L. & MED. 219, 229-30
(1987) (discussing the expansion of euthanasia in the Netherlands).
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limited her holding to adults,79 why should minors be excluded? A
Florida court recently ruled that a mentally competent minor had
the same right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment as an
adult.80 Inevitably, a similar extension will follow for a liberty inter-
est in physician-assisted suicide.
There is no certain end to this slippery slope. Granting constitu-
tional protection to a terminally ill patient's desire for a physician-
assisted suicide will initiate an avalanche of predictable equal pro-
tection challenges destined to broaden the impact of the initial rul-
ing."1 This process is illustrated by the landmark pair of United
States Supreme Court decisions protecting an individual's constitu-
tional right to obtain contraceptives.8 2 The first decision found that
married persons have, as a part of "the notions of privacy surround-
ing the marriage relationship," a constitutionally protected privacy
right to obtain contraceptives despite a state law outlawing such de-
vises for everyone." When another state sought to save its law
against contraceptives by adding an exemption for married persons,
the Supreme Court properly ruled that it "violates the rights of sin-
gle persons under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." ' 4 Should Judge Rothstein's holding stand with re-
spect to physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill, equal pro-
tection analysis will surely extend it on to others.
B. Preventing Undue Influence
The other major concern raised by the state in defense of the stat-
79. The liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in physician-assisted suicide
was ascribed to those "competent, terminally ill adults." Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850
F. Supp. 1454, 1462 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
80. Benito "Benny" Agrelo, a fifteen year old liver transplant recipient, decided to stop taking
his medicine which was designed to help his body accept the transplanted organ. Behind a Boy's
Decision to Forgo Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1994, at A12. Benny complained that the
drug caused back and leg pain and severe headaches. Id. He stated that he'd "rather stay home
and live as close [as he] can to a natural life and die without having side effects." Id. A Broward
County Circuit Court judge upheld Benny's decision to forego the drug therapy. Id.
81. Judge Rothstein found not only that mentally competent, terminally ill adult patients had a
constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide, but that the Washington statutory ban imposed
an undue burden upon the exercise of that right. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1465.
Further, Judge Rothstein noted that the law, "by creating an exception for those patients on life
support, yet not permitting competent, terminally ill adult patients . . . the equivalent option ...
of exercising their rights to hasten their deaths with medical assistance" violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Id. at 1467.
82. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
83. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
84. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443.
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ute involved preventing undue influence, duress, abuse, and mistake
in the commission of physician-assisted suicide.88 Dismissing this de-
fense, Judge Rothstein wrote:
[t]he State's second state interest, protecting people from committing sui-
cide due to undue influence or duress, is also unquestionably a legitimate
consideration. But it is'undisputed that plaintiffs in this case are mentally
competent individuals who have reached a decision to commit physician-as-
sisted suicide free from any undue influence. 86
After noting that Washington State law allows individuals to refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment and permits such decisions to be
made by proxy decision-makers,87 the judge added, "[tlhe potential
risk of abuse and undue influence is often just as great and may be
greater in certain cases for a patient who requests to be discon-
nected from a life support system. The risk of abuse is especially
present if the patient is incompetent and a surrogate is making the
decision. '"88 But Judge Rothstein provided no evidence to support
her opinions on this point.
There is good reason for concern about the risk of unintended
undue influence here, especially when dealing with the elderly.89 Ac-
cording to Yale Kamisar, "'Ageism' . . . may manifest itself in a
failure to recognize treatable depression, . . . the view that an eld-
erly person's desire to commit suicide is more 'rational' than a
younger patient's would be." 90 That could lead to the easy accept-
ance of physician-assisted suicide by physically ill senior citizens
without sufficient investigation of their motives.91 In a recent book
on suicide, George Colt observed, "[a]lthough we shrink from the
idea of elderly suicide and euthanasia, we encourage it by our neg-
lect and indifference." '92 Similarly, sociologist Menno Boldt stated,
85. Compassion in Dying, 850 F.Supp. at 1465.
86. Id.
87. Judge Rothstein noted that the Washington code allows an individual to refuse life sus-
taining treatment, a right which was affirmed by the Washington Supreme Court. Id. (citations
omitted). Further, Judge Rothstein noted that the Washington code allows for such decisions re-
garding such treatments to be exercised by "an authorized representative holding a durable power
of attorney." Id. (citation omitted).
88. Id.
89. See CUNDIFF, supra note 78, at 62-63 (discussing how elderly people may feel pressured to
ask for euthanasia).
90. Kamisar, supra note 42, at 39 (discussing the dangers of establishing a right to suicide,
particularly for the elderly).
91. Id. at 38-39. For an analysis of this issue as it applies to the practice of euthanasia in the
Netherlands, see GOMEZ, supra note 70, at 104-13.
92. GEORGE COLT, THE ENIGMA OF SUICIDE 394 (1991).
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"[s]uicidal persons are succumbing to what they experience as an
overpowering and unrelenting coercion in their environment to cease
living."93 That sense of coercion could be increased by condoning
physician-assisted suicide. In her analysis of the subject, ethicist Sis-
sela Bok concluded that "the possibility of abuses and errors" in the
practice of euthanasia, especially in cases involving the "senile" and
the "powerless," outweigh the potential benefit of the practice for
some compelling cases.94
Based on the testimony of such experts, state legislators reasona-
bly could find that this coercion might intensify in a state that sanc-
tions physician-assisted suicide. Indeed, they could conclude that, if
physician-assisted suicide is legal, freely discussed, and openly prac-
ticed, then more people, especially the infirm and the elderly, will
see it as a socially acceptable way to save society, their family, and
themselves from the burdens of old age and serious illness." Even if
legislators could not prove that legalizing physician-assisted suicide
for the terminally ill would unduly encourage these and other people
to take their own lives, and increase the likelihood of duress and
mistake in this context, they surely have a reasonable basis for re-
sponding to these concerns by outlawing the procedure. Indeed,
given the magnitude of this societal interest, it should be enough to
sustain the statute unless there is some alternative, less burdensome,
means to redress it. Judge Rothstein's decision failed to address this
point other than by simply professing that, despite her ruling, the
legislature could still "devise regulations" designed to prevent
"abuse, coercion or undue influence from third parties" in the prac-
tice of assisted suicide. 96 Yet her decision struck down just such a
regulation, without suggesting any workable alternative.
Further, even where abuse, coercion, and undue influence from
third parties is not present, a person diagnosed with a terminal ill-
ness might choose physician-assisted suicide not because she wants
to die, but because she fears the pain that may come at a later stage
of her illness or losing control over life-sustaining treatment deci-
sions in the event that she becomes incompetent. Should physician-
93. See Kamisar, supra note 42, at 39 (quoting Menno Boldt).
94. Sissela Bok, Euthanasia and the Care of the Dying, in THE DILEMMA OF EUTHANASIA 1, 8-
9 (John A. Behnke & Sissela Bok eds., 1975).
95. For an analysis of this issue, see GOMEZ, supra note 70, at 104-13; see also CUNDIFF, supra
note 78, at 62-63 (discussing how frail and elderly people may feel pressured to ask for euthanasia
in order to save their families financial and emotional burdens).
96. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1465 n.10 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
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assisted suicide be condoned, then a patient might accept that route
without fully exploring the very real alternatives of pain manage-
ment, which can be effective in nearly every case,97 and advance
treatment directives,98 which can protect a person's control over life-
sustaining treatment after she becomes incompetent.99 In this re-
spect, a report from America's leading bio-ethics study center, The
Hastings Center, dismissed the argument for assisted suicide as a
means to avoid a painful death by observing, "[i]f medicine's capac-
ity for relieving pain and suffering were fully tapped, there would
probably be no significant foundation for this argument." 100 It and
other commentaries on the subject have endorsed advance treatment
directives as preferable means to preserve self-determination over
terminal health-care decisions.' By adopting the name "Compas-
sion in Dying," the entity instigating this litigation professed con-
cern for the rights and interests of the infirm.' 0 2 But legislators rea-
sonably could believe that, on balance, a law against assisted suicide
helps the terminally ill much more than it hurts them. It protects
them from the duress and mistakes that could lead vulnerable
human beings to premature death. 03 At the very least, this is a de-
termination - a balancing of societal benefits and burdens - best
97. For a discussion of pain management as an effective alternative to euthanasia, see Mat-
thew E. Conolly, Alternative to Euthanasia: Pain Management, 4 ISSUES L. & MED. 497 (1989).
Conolly states:
The call for euthanasia is often based upon the notion that the terminally ill are
bound to suffer horribly, and that this suffering can only be relieved by death itself.
Like all lies and half truths, this is in danger of being believed, if for no other reason
than because it is so often and so loudly trumpeted by misinformed persons in the
proeuthanasia lobby. It cannot be stated firmly enough that this is a false premise.
It is false in the sense that it does not have to be so, for there is already much that
can be done which will effectively alleviate suffering.
Id.
98. Justice O'Connor refers to advanced treatment directives as "explicit oral or written in-
structions regarding [a patient's] intent to refuse medical treatment should [the patient] become
incompetent." Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). For a discussion of different types of advanced treatment directives, see id. at 289-92.
99. See HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 78-80 (1987) (discussing advanced treatment directives).
100. Id. at 129.
101. Id. at 78-84; see also Bok, supra note 94, at 9 (favoring endorsed advanced treatment
directives).
102. Compassion in Dying is a Washington non-for-profit organization which provides free in-
formation, counseling and assistance both to mentally competent, terminally ill adults who are
considering suicide and to their families. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454,
1458 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
103. For a discussion of duress and undue influence, see supra notes 85-105 and accompanying
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left to the democratic process rather than to judicial fiat. In 1991,
Washington State voters rejected a ballot initiative to legalize physi-
cian-assisted suicide. 10 4 The court should not overrule the judgment
of the people.
III. EXAMINING EQUAL PROTECTION
In Compassion in Dying,10 5 the plaintiffs raised a second objec-
tion to the Washington State law against assisted suicide.10 6 As the
court explained:
[pilaintiffs in this case contend that Washington State law unconstitution-
ally distinguishes between two similarly situated groups of mentally compe-
tent, terminally ill adults. Under current state law, those terminally ill per-
sons whose condition involves the use of life-sustaining equipment may
lawfully obtain medical assistance in terminating such treatment, including
food and water, and thereby hasten death, while those who also suffer from
terminal illnesses, but whose treatment does not involve the use of life sup-
port systems, are denied the option of hastening death with medical
assistance."'7
In short, plaintiffs equated a patient whose death is being postponed
solely due to the intervention of medical treatment with a person
who is diagnosed as being terminally ill but remains able to survive
without treatment. 08 Without providing a scintilla of authority for
her decision on this point, Judge Rothstein concluded, "[t]he court
finds the two groups of mentally competent, terminally ill adults at
issue here to be similarly situated."'0 9
The absence of authority on this point is striking because it deals
with a central issue in medical ethics. Although some modern medi-
cal ethicists and physicians agree with Judge Rothstein's position," 0
the great weight of authority maintains that there is a fundamental
difference between allowing patients to die by withdrawing medical
intervention and hastening death through a medical intervention."'
104. Gross, supra note 16, at B16.
105. 850 F. Supp. 1464 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
106. Id. at 1466.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1467.
110. E.g., Marcia Angell, Euthanasia, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1348, 1350 (1988) (presenting
the view of the proponents of euthanasia).
111. See infra notes 108-32 and accompanying text (discussing the authorities that maintain a
distinction between allowing patients to die by withdrawing medical intervention and hastening
death with affirmative medical action).
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This distinction dates at least as far back in Western medical tradi-
tion as the ancient Hippocratic Oath, which has been described as
"the earliest and most impressive document in medical ethics." ' 12
Referring to this oath, the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade"' ob-
served, "it represents the apex of the development of strict ethical
concepts in medicine, and its influence endures to this day.'"14
Under the Hippocratic Oath, which is attributed to the 4th century
B.C. Greek physician Hippocrates, a physician may refrain from
treating patients but may never prescribe any "deadly medicine,"
even if asked.1 1 5
The major Anglo-American professional associations of physi-
cians vigorously maintain this distinction today." 6 For example, the
American Medical Association condemns physician-assisted suicide
as "contrary to that for which the medical profession stands" while
it condones the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment if it is in
accordance with "the decision of the patient and/or his immediate
family."1 1 7 The British Medical Association took a similar position
stating, "[t]here is a distinction between an active intervention by a
112. Donald D. Millikin, Oath of Hippocrates, in 12 COLLIER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA 137, 137
(1994).
113. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1971).
114. Id. at 131.
115. The text of the Hippocratic Oath is reprinted in Millikin, supra note 113, at 101; see also
Willard Gaylin et al., Doctors Must Not Kill, 259 JAMA 2139, 2139 (1988) (commenting on the
Oath of Hippocrates and the distinction between failing to treat patients and prescribing deadly
medicine).
116. See infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (discussing the American Medical Associa-
tion and British Medical Association's position on affirmative medical action to terminate life).
117. Thomas D. Sullivan, Active and Passive Euthanasia: An Impertinent Distinction?, in Eu-
THANASIA: THE MORAL IssUEs 53, 54 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1989)
(quoting from the 1973 resolution of the American Medical Association House of Delegates). The
American Medical Association states that:
Assisted suicide occurs when a physician provides a patient with the medical means
and/or the medical knowledge to commit suicide. . . . In physician-assisted suicide,
the patient performs the life-ending act, whereas in euthanasia, the physician ad-
ministers the death-causing drug or other agent.
Assisted suicide and euthanasia should not be confused with the provision of a palli-
ative treatment that may hasten the patient's death ....
Assisted suicide also must be distinguished from withholding or withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment, in which the patient's death occurs because the patient or the
patient's proxy, in consultation with the treating physician, decides that the disadvan-
tages of treatment outweigh its advantages and therefore that treatment is refused.
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL AssOCIATION, 5 CODE OF MED-
ICAL ETHICS REPORTS 269-70 (1994) (footnotes omitted) (Rept. # 59, Physician-Assisted Sui-
cide). The American Medical Association continues to condemn physician assisted suicide as
"fundamentally inconsistent with the physician's professional role." Id. at 274.
PRESCRIPTION FOR DEATH
doctor to terminate life and a decision not to prolong life (a non-
treatment decision). ' '"18
Leading medical ethicists also accept this distinction. For exam-
ple, in an influential 1987 report asserting the right of patients to
refuse life-sustaining treatment, the Hastings Center observed:
[s]ome persons who accept this right of patients to decide to forgo treatment
are concerned nevertheless that the values supporting it, and in particular
self-determination, necessarily imply that voluntary euthanasia and assisted
suicide are also justified. We disagree. Medical tradition and customary
practice distinguish in a broadly acceptable fashion between the refusal of
medical interventions and intentionally causing death or assisting suicide.1"
Elaborating on this distinction, the report explained:
Our society forbids assisting suicide or active euthanasia, even if the motive
is compassionate. This prohibition serves to sustain the societal value of re-
spect for life and to provide some safeguards against abuse of the authority
to take actions that shorten life. It also encourages us to provide decent and
humane care to those who suffer, and to those who are dependent, ill, or
impaired. Since these people are already vulnerable to being mistreated, un-
dertreated, or avoided, eroding the legal prohibition of active euthanasia
might well further endanger them. Respecting the individual's liberty to di-
rect his or her own life requires, however, that patients generally be allowed
to refuse medical interventions, even if others feel that this is contrary to the
patient's best interests.'"
Four of America's premier physician-ethicists, Willard Gaylin, Leon
R. Kass, Edmund D. Pellegrino, and Mark Siegler, jointly declared,
"[gIenerations of physicians and commentators on medical ethics
have underscored and held fast to the distinction between ceasing
useless treatments (or allowing to die) and active, willful, taking of
life . . "I In a statement that utterly denounces Judge Roth-
stein's position, these four distinguished scholars added, "[n]either
legal tolerance nor the best bedside manner can ever make medical
killing medically ethical.' ' 2 An exhaustive study by the official
New York State Task Force on Life and the Law reached a similar
conclusion in 1994.123
118. Conclusions of a British Medical Association Review of Guidelines on Euthanasia, in
EUTHANASIA: THE MORAL ISSUES 155 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1989).
119. HASTINGS CENTER, supra note 99, at 128.
120. Id.
121. Gaylin, supra note 115, at 2139.
122. Id.
123. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: As-
SISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT (1994). Also in 1994, in the litiga-
tion spawned by Dr. Jack Kevorkian's practice of physician-assisted suicide, a Michigan appellate
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Given the overwhelming weight of medical and ethical authority
against her position, it is not surprising that Judge Rothstein did not
cite any basis (other than her own opinion) for equating physician-
assisted suicide with terminating life-sustaining medical treat-
ment.1 24 Physicians and medical ethicists typically view the two situ-
ations as fundamentally different, despite any amount of subtle judi-
cial draftsmanship to make it appear otherwise. The only evidence
that Judge Rothstein offered in support of her equal-protection
claim is the irrelevant observation that Washington State law per-
mits patients to refuse life-sustaining treatment. 125 "Thus," she rea-
soned, "the State has already recognized that its interest in prevent-
ing suicide does not require an absolute ban."12 Of course,
Washington State does not outlaw suicide - it simply tries to dis-
courage it through a law against assisting suicide. 2 7 Further, the
state law she cited, the Washington Natural Death Act, expressly
provides that the termination of life-sustaining treatment pursuant
to the Act "shall not, for any purpose, constitute a suicide.' 28
Moreover, that Act incorporates an absolute ban against "mercy
killing." '129 Finally, as noted above, mainstream medical and ethical
opinion does not equate terminating life-sustaining treatment with
assisted suicide. 3 ' As the 1987 Hastings Center report concluded,
"a reasonable, if not unambiguous, line [can] be drawn between
foregoing life-sustaining treatment on the one hand, and active eu-
thanasia or assisted suicide of the other."'' Judge Rothstein simply
ignored this line and wrongly ordered the state to do likewise.
court accepted this distinction in the context of considering the constitutionality of a state law
against assisted suicide. Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487, 493 (Mich. Ct. App.
1994). According to one legal analysis of that decision, "[iut distinguished the right to refuse
treatment recognized in Cruzan . . . as only 'to passively die a natural death,' not to actively
intervene to hasten one's death." Goldberg, supra note 27, at 73.
124. See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction drawn by Judge
Rothstein).
125. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F.Supp. 1454, 1467 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text (discussing Washington's laws against assist-
ing suicide).
128. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.070(1) (1993).
129. Id. § 70.112.100.
130. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text (discussing how the majority of ethicists
and medical professionals maintain a distinction between terminating life-sustaining treatment
and assisted suicide).




Even Judge Rothstein. conceded that legitimate, constitutionally
valid interests support a law against assisted suicide in the vast ma-
jority of cases.' 32 Yet she struck down the entire statute on the basis
of three compelling cases, where the terminally ill patients were al-
legedly suffering uncontrollable pain, 3 ' rather than simply enjoin
the application of the law in those instances. Indeed, there is no
indication that the state would have prosecuted physicians for assist-
ing these dying patients to commit suicide.' 3 4 By the court's own
terms, it should not have allowed judicial review of the statute in
such a situation. "Regarding the applicable standard of review,"
Judge Rothstein wrote, "the Supreme Court held in Casey that, in
order to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of a state statute, plain-
tiffs had to show that it would 'operate as a substantial obstacle' to
the exercise of a constitutional right and would, therefore, constitute
an 'undue burden.' "35 Otherwise, the statute should not be over-
turned in a facial challenge to its constitutionality. Elaborating on
this standard, she quoted from an appellate court ruling that Casey,
which invalidated a Pennsylvania anti-abortion statute, "requires
only that a plaintiff show an abortion regulation would be an undue
burden 'in a large fraction of the cases.' "136 Certainly a law re-
stricting abortion only applies to women seeking abortions, and
Casey correctly reviewed it prior to its application.' 37 But a law
broadly restricting people from aiding a suicide attempt does not
primarily involve persons of the type at issue in this case. Indeed,
the court defined the plaintiff class as terminally ill, mentally-com-
petent, adults acting knowingly and voluntarily without undue influ-
ence, who seek physician aid, without indicating how many people
132. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1464-65 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
133. Id. at 1456-57.
134. A committee of leading physicians in this field suggested that although no medical deci-
sion can be immune from prosecution, courts in the United States generally have not attached
consequences in such cases. Sidney H. Wanzer et al., The Physician's Responsibility Toward
Hopelessly Ill Patients, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 844, 847 (1989). The official comment to the
Model Penal Code section dealing with this issue makes a similar suggestion. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.5 cmt. 5 (1962). For the text of this comment, see supra note 24 and accompanying
text.
135. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1462 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.
Ct. 2791, 2830 (1992)).
136. Id. at 1463 (quoting Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 14 F.3d 848, 863 n.21 (3d Cir. 1994)).
137. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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this includes. 1 8 Surely it constitutes only a small fraction of the
number of persons protected by a law against assisted suicide.
Therefore, this case did not offer a proper vehicle for reviewing the
overall statute.
In the course of her decision, Judge Rothstein acknowleaged,
"[o]bviously the state has a strong, legitimate interest in deterring
suicide by young people."1 9 She also admitted, "[i]t is well within
the legislative prerogative to enact regulations and restrictions
which will ensure that undue influence from third parties plays no
part in the choice of physician-assisted suicide." 140 This is precisely
what Washington's statute against assisted suicide does, and Judge
Rothstein has not shown that there is any better way to accomplish
it.
138. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1467.
139. Id. at 1464.
140. Id. at 1466.
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